这一章节深入探讨了1962年5月的股市波动，将其与臭名昭著的1929年股市崩盘进行了比较和对比。开篇强调了股市固有的波动性，正如J.P.摩根简洁的评论所捕捉到的那样：“它会波动的。” 随后，叙述探索了自1611年阿姆斯特丹建立第一个证券交易所以来出现的社会和行为模式，并注意到尽管技术进步，这些模式却出人意料地持续存在。 本章重点关注了1962年5月28日至31日发生的引人注目的事件，当时道琼斯工业平均指数经历了大幅下跌，随后又出现了显著的反弹。5月28日，股市遭遇了历史上第二大的单日点数跌幅，引发了一阵焦虑。第二天，它以令人印象深刻的涨幅反弹，同时伴随着创纪录的交易量。这场危机于5月31日结束，市场恢复到危机前的水平。 本章分析了这些事件发生后的解释和比较。人们不可避免地将之与1929年的崩盘进行比较，这是由于相似的价格走势和交易量造成的。然而，作者强调了这两个时期之间的关键差异，特别是法规和信贷限制的实施，这些限制减轻了发生灾难性损失的可能性。 本章还回顾了市场动荡期间的情绪和反应。《道琼斯新闻服务》反映了日益增长的担忧，而经纪公司则面临着蜂拥而至的卖单。作者生动地描述了经纪公司办公室里的场景，人们纷纷涌入，亲眼目睹这场正在上演的戏剧。广播和电视的报道加剧了公众的担忧，由于磁带延迟和通讯故障，进一步复杂化了交易的执行。 随着市场暴跌，经纪人努力维持秩序并为客户提供建议。追加保证金通知蜂拥而至，要求借款人提供额外的抵押品。作者强调了自1929年以来大幅增长的共同基金可能构成的潜在危险。人们担心大量赎回基金份额可能会引发连锁反应，导致灾难性的市场崩溃。 本章详细描述了5月29日星期二市场出现转机的过程。关键时刻发生在作为领头羊股票的美国电话电报公司扭转了下跌趋势，引发了一场广泛的上涨。电话业务的场内专家小乔治·M·L·勒布兰奇以及下达大量电话股票订单的约翰·J·克兰利在这一戏剧性的转变中发挥了关键作用。 本章将这一事件与理查德·惠特尼试图阻止1929年股市崩盘的努力进行了对比，强调1962年的复苏更为真实，人为操纵的成分更少。普拉姆利在国家新闻俱乐部发表的讲话也成为了叙事的一部分，这是由于其巧合的时机，以及当时该讲话是对肯尼迪总统处理经济的方式的抨击。本章还涉及了经纪公司清理这段时期内客户订单混乱的问题。 作者在结尾考察了危机过后出现的解释和分析。纽约证券交易所进行了一次彻底的调查，结果表明个人投资者，尤其是那些收入较高的人，是最积极的卖家，而共同基金通过在市场下跌期间购买股票并在市场复苏期间出售股票，起到了稳定作用。最终，本章表明1962年的危机是一个复杂事件，没有单一的原因。它提醒人们股市固有的波动性以及未来可能发生的类似事件，尽管存在保障措施。它还强调了这样一种观点，即人们本质上是贪婪的，并且在某个时候，另一次崩盘是不可避免的。

The chapter delves into the stock market fluctuations of May 1962, drawing parallels and contrasts to the infamous 1929 crash. It begins by highlighting the inherent volatility of the stock market, a characteristic famously captured by J.P. Morgan's dry remark that "it will fluctuate." The narrative then explores the sociological and behavioral patterns that have emerged since the establishment of the first stock exchange in Amsterdam in 1611, noting their surprising persistence despite technological advancements. The chapter focuses on the dramatic events of May 28-31, 1962, when the Dow Jones Industrial Average experienced a significant drop followed by a remarkable recovery. On May 28th, the market suffered its second-largest single-day point decline, triggering a wave of anxiety. The next day, it rebounded with an impressive gain, accompanied by record-breaking trading volume. The crisis concluded on May 31st, with the market regaining its pre-crisis level. The chapter analyzes the explanations and comparisons that followed these events. It was inevitable to draw parallels with the 1929 crash, fueled by similar price movements and trading volumes. However, the author emphasizes the crucial differences between the two periods, particularly the implementation of regulations and credit limitations that mitigated the potential for catastrophic losses. The chapter also recounts the mood and reactions during the market turmoil. The Dow Jones News Service reflected the growing apprehension, while brokerage firms faced an overwhelming surge in sell orders. The author vividly describes the scenes in brokerage offices, where "walk-ins" flooded in to witness the unfolding drama. Radio and television broadcasts heightened public concern, further complicating the execution of trades due to tape delays and communication breakdowns. As the market plummeted, brokers struggled to maintain order and advise their customers. Margin calls flooded in, demanding additional collateral from borrowers. The author highlights the potential danger posed by mutual funds, which had grown significantly since 1929. The fear was that mass redemptions of fund shares could trigger a cascading effect, leading to a devastating market collapse. The chapter provides a detailed account of the market's turnaround on Tuesday, May 29th. The key moment occurred when American Telephone and Telegraph, a bellwether stock, reversed its downward trend, sparking a widespread rally. The actions of George M. L. Le Branch, Jr., the floor specialist in telephone, and John J. Cranley, who placed a large order for telephone shares, played crucial roles in this dramatic shift. The chapter contrasts this event with Richard Whitney's attempt to halt the 1929 crash, emphasizing that the 1962 recovery was more genuine and less orchestrated. Plumlee's speech at the National Press Club became part of the narrative, due to its fortuitous timing and the fact that it was an attack on President Kennedy's handling of the economy at the time. The chapter also touches upon the problems that brokerages had untangling the mess of customer orders that occurred during the period. The author concludes by examining the explanations and analyses that emerged after the crisis. The New York Stock Exchange conducted a thorough investigation, revealing that individual investors, particularly those with higher incomes, were the most active sellers, while mutual funds acted as a stabilizing force by purchasing shares during the downturn and selling them during the recovery. Ultimately, the chapter suggests that the 1962 crisis was a complex event with no single cause. It serves as a reminder of the inherent volatility of the stock market and the potential for similar events to occur in the future, despite safeguards. It also highlighted the idea that people are, by their very nature, greedy, and that at some point another crash is inevitable.